Robert B. Feingold & Associates, P.C.
Fleet Building - Fifth Floor
700 Pleasant Street
New Bedford, Massachusetts 02740

Telephone:

A sea of change. Financial institutions can now obtain your medical records and use the information to make credit decisions. The government can take your property and give it to private developers under eminent domain powers. Employees can insist that you let them work at home when they are disabled. Smokers can be evicted by their landlord even if smoking at home is legal and the lease permits it.

Few of our newsletters have discussed so many important changes in the way America does business. Please take the time to read these articles and feel free to call us with any questions that you may have. I am confident that it will be worth the time you spend.

 

HEALTH CARE/PRIVACY

Your Medical Records Become Fair Game:

Changes to the Fair Credit Reporting Act

The Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act (FACTA) contains revisions to the Fair Credit and Reporting Act (FCRA). Under FACTA, credit agencies, including banks, can obtain an individual?s medical records, if the medical records are relevant to a credit decision (including cancellation of credit or non-renewal), an insurance application or an employment decision. The new law is effective March 2006.

Under FACTA, medical information includes the past, present, or future physical, mental, or behavioral health or condition of an individual. Creditors may obtain and use medical information to the extent it is necessary and appropriate to protect legitimate operational, transactional, risk, consumer and other needs. In other words, this information can be obtained and used to determine whether, for example, your health makes you a good (or poor) credit risk. What is appropriate or necessary will be determined by regulators. Consent forms will be required.

Another important change in the new law is a severe limit on private rights of action to sue violators. This means that, when creditors violate a consumer?s right of privacy, only the federal agency regulating the creditor will be able to action against the creditor.

The relationship between this permissible use of medical information and HIPAA which is designed to protect a patient?s right to privacy remains to be determined. The message is that credit decisions will now be based, in part, on the applicant?s health or illness, and an individual will not be able to sue if his/her medical information is improperly disseminated or used. We envision many requests from patients to their physicians to intervene to reverse adverse credit actions.

Please call if you would like a copy of the statute or to discuss the implications of this important change in the way America does business.

 

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BUSINESS AND EMPLOYMENT LAW

 

Working at Home:

May Be a "Reasonable Accommodation" for a Disabled Employee

The Massachusetts Court of Appeals has recently held that allowing an employee to work at home would have been a reasonable accommodation. In Smith v. Bell Atlantic, as an accommodation, the company had allowed the plaintiff "to work at home at least two days a week and either at home or in [the] Marlborough [office] on the other days." However, the plaintiff, who was suffering from post-polio syndrome, had difficulty commuting to the Marlborough office and requested that she be allowed to commute to her former office in Waltham. Based on the company?s refusal to transfer her to a closer office and failure to provide the support (e.g., computer programs, training, equipment, etc.) needed to have a home office, the employee alleged discrimination.

The company claimed that "employers have no obligation to reasonably accommodate by agreeing to work-from-home arrangements or providing home office equipment". However, the Court of Appeals affirmed the jury?s verdict, which awarded the employee (i) $1 million for lost future wages, (ii) $300,000 for future medical and life care costs, and (iii) $407,000 for emotional distress. Additionally, the court affirmed the trial court?s award of (i) $246,234 in attorneys? fees, (ii) $34,762 in cost, and (iii) prejudgment interest.

Key facts on which the court based its decision include:

C "Other, non-handicapped second-level managers ? did almost all of their work from home";

C The company had previously allowed the plaintiff to work part-time at home;

C The company did not claim that allowing the plaintiff to work at home full-time would constitute an undue hardship; and

C "[A]lthough the company nominally agreed to a work-from-home arrangement, it did not adequately implement it."

This is a case of enormous importance for Massachusetts employers. The impact on this employer was substantial and avoidable. The lessons to be learned: If you are going to let some employees work at home, you need to understand that you may be forced to let handicapped employees do so as well. If a company does not want to do that, it should now allow anyone to work from home. Lesson two; taking a hard line can be very costly ($2,000,000 in this case) and non-litigious solutions should be very seriously considered.

 

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Employee Identity Information Must Be Destroyed

Employers that maintain employee identifying information (EII) are prime targets for the crime of identity theft. EII includes, but is not limited to, social security numbers, telephone numbers, addresses, driver?s license numbers, e-mail addresses, information obtained from credit reports, credit card information, and insurance information. That information can be contained in paperwork, as well as computer database systems, and is vulnerable to penetration by both insiders and outsiders. As of June 1st, all employers are now required to destroy EII before it?s discarded.

Responding to the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) adopted the new rule ? 16 C.F.R. Part 682, "Disposal of Consumer Report Information and Records" ? which requires employers that possess or maintain personally identifying information to take reasonable measures to protect against unauthorized access or improper use in connection with information disposal.

There are consequences for noncompliance. Victims are entitled to recover their actual damages sustained as a result of a violation of the rule and may seek statutory damages of up to $1,000 per violation. Federal and state authorities may file legal enforcement actions to impose civil fines for each violation of the rule as well. In addition, an employer?s willful failure to comply could result in punitive damages and/or a class-action lawsuit.

In responding to the FTC?s new rule, employers should minimize the risk of identity theft by managing EII with heightened sensitivity. Employers should review internal policies and procedures governing the collection, use, distribution, and disposal of EII. When such policies and/or procedures are inadequate, new ones should be implemented. Security measures should include periodic evaluation of EII safeguards.

 

 

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Use "SAVE" System

to Check Employee's Immigration Status

In a recent case, the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) alleged that Wal-Mart had direct knowledge of immigration violations involving its cleaning contractors at stores across the country. This year, Wal-Mart agreed to pay $11 million to settle the allegations that it knowingly used illegal immigrants to clean its stores.

Ignoring the immigration status of leased employees is dangerous. At the very least, employers should implement protective policies regarding all service contracts by requiring the inclusion of written assurances and employee lessor compliance standards, as well as indemnification provisions. But employee lessors will not have insurance to cover this kind of liability and may not have substantial assets to honor an indemnification claim. Therefore, an additional protective step is to review the legal status of your leased employees and independent contractors.

You could demand the leased employees? I-9 employment verification forms. However, to avoid reviewing I-9s, you may consider your participating in the new Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements (SAVE) program. This program, which is operated jointly by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Social Security Administration (SSA), enables employers to virtually ensure that all employees are in legal status. Under SAVE, an employer is given software that permits it to access the joint database of both DHS and SSA to verify the employment authorization of all newly hired employees. Employers may sign up for the SAVE program at https://www.vis-dhs.com/employerregistration. The program is free to participating employers.

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"Discovery Rule" Applied to Extend Discrimination Statute of Limitations to Four Years from 45 Days

The Eighth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals recently allowed an age discrimination action to go forward, even though the plaintiff did not file a complaint of discrimination until four years after the alleged discriminatory action. (As a controller, he had only 45 days in which to file an EEOC charge.)

In this case, an air controller made a general application for an air controller position. Subsequently, an airport authority hired 13 controllers without contacting him. The plaintiff learned about the 13 positions four years after they were filled.

The court concluded that a discrimination claim?s time limit could be paused in situations "that are truly beyond the control" of the employee or job applicant, such as not having knowledge that the discriminatory action had taken place. Based on that holding, the court ruled that because the plaintiff did not find out about the 1998 hiring until 2002, the 45-day limit was tolled. The court also found justification in the fact that he had acted within the time limit once he became aware of the discrimination.

The statute of limitations for filing discrimination claims may be dramatically extended. An employee may still file a discrimination suit against an employer years after the discriminatory action took place, if the failure to file a complaint sooner resulted from a late discovery of the discerning behavior.

 

 

REAL ESTATE LAW

 

Government May Take Private Property for Private Developers

The U.S. Supreme Court has recently held that a city may take private property by eminent domain in furtherance of the city?s economic development plan (EDP). The property owners objected "claiming, ? that the taking of their properties would violate the ?public use? restriction in the Fifth Amendment?s Takings Clause." And they argued that the city was taking their properties "under the mere pretext of a public purpose, when its actual purpose was to bestow a private benefit" on private developers.

The Court recognized that "the government?s pursuit of a public purpose will often benefit individual private parties." However, even though all of the property in the EDP would not be accessible by the general public, the Court sided with the city, holding that the takings were for a "public purpose," because they "would be executed pursuant to a ?carefully considered? development plan."

The government can now take private property through eminent domain proceedings to enable private developers to use the land for private profit, so long as the government can point to a resulting public good or purpose, such as job creation and increased real estate taxes. This is quite different than taking land to build a highway, a military base, hospital or park.

 

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Smoking Is a Legal Nuisance

In Harwood Capital Corp. v. Carey, the landlord sought to evict two tenants after receiving complaints from abutting residents about the strong smell of smoke coming from the tenants? apartment. Even though the tenants had a legal right to smoke under both state law and the lease, a jury in the Boston Housing Court agreed that the tenants? smoking violated a clause in the standard Greater Boston Real Estate Board lease prohibiting tenants from creating a nuisance or engaging in activity that substantially interfered with the rights of other building occupants.

The tenants smoked "about 40 to 60 cigarettes a day." A number of neighboring tenants testified at trial about how the second-hand smoke was interfering with their lives.

This case appears to be the first American verdict in which a landlord has been allowed to evict a tenant for smoking, even where it was legal to smoke in the building and the landlord was fully aware of the tenant?s smoking when the lease was signed.

 

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Signed Real Estate Offers Can Be Binding

In a recent Massachusetts case, a real estate buyer brought suit against the seller after the seller refused to execute a purchase and sale agreement, as required by the signed offer. On appeal, the Massachusetts Appeals Court found that the seller was within his legal rights to void the transaction.

However, the reason the buyer lost was because there was an addendum to the offer that "provided for a sixty-day ?due-diligence? period, a series of subsequent contingent deposits, an optional purchase money mortgage in favor of [the] seller, and a discount for [the seller] in purchasing a condominium on the property should [the buyer] build condominium units." The Appeals Court stated that the addendum "caused the contemplated sale here to depart from the clarity of the offer to purchase ?, and introduced new elements to the transaction too significant to be considered ministerial or subsidiary, yet too vaguely framed to justify a conclusion that the parties intended to be bound by the terms of this offer." Otherwise, the court would have followed a 1999 Supreme Judicial Court case and enforced the offer to purchase real estate as a binding contract between the parties.

In sum, the court did not enforce the offer as a contract only because of the contingencies in the offer. However, most offers do not have such elaborate contingencies and will likely be enforced as binding contracts.

Many believe that they do not need to consult counsel before signing an offer to buy or to sell real estate. These new cases make very clear that you should have an attorney review real estate offers BEFORE signing them. Otherwise, you may be freezing your position without maximizing your leverage and protecting your best interests.

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Purchasing Real Estate:

The Bank?s Attorney Is Not Your Attorney

In a recent Massachusetts Court of Appeals case, the purchaser of a mixed-use residential and commercial building discovered after the closing that the sale did not include six deeded parking spaces. The purchaser sued the bank?s attorney for failing "to discover that the deed did not in fact convey the parking spaces." The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court?s entry of summary judgment in favor of the bank?s attorney, because the purchaser was not the client of the bank?s attorney and, therefore, the buyer could not reasonably rely on the bank?s attorney to bring the non-inclusion of the parking spaces to her attention.

 

Many purchasers of real estate simply assume that the attorney handling a real estate closing will ensure that their interests are represented, especially if the attorney is assigned by the bank providing them with financing. However, the bank?s attorney does not represent the purchaser and will not be liable to the purchaser if errors are made. Instead, the only attorney-client duty the bank?s attorney has is to the bank. It is very important for you to hire competent counsel whose only responsibility is to protect your interests in a real estate transaction. To do otherwise can be very counterproductive.

 

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Written Agreements May Not Protect Real Estate Sellers

and Brokers from Claims for Misrepresentation

A disclaimer may not disclaim anything, particularly in purchase and sale agreements containing boilerplate language. A Massachusetts Superior Court recently held that a buyer?s case for oral misrepresentations is not barred by a purchase and sale agreement?s disclaimer, which specifically excluded all representations outside of the agreement. The court stated; "That fraud claim, if proven at trial, may provide a reasonable basis for ignoring the plain language of the exculpatory contractual disclaimers in the P&S Agreement."

The buyer stated that the brokers told her that the property line was represented by a cedar fence on the lot and that she would, as a matter of right, be able to expand the dwelling upward and outward. These representations were not true. Yet, the buyer acknowledged in the P&S Agreement that she was not relying on any representations. However, the court stated that "where fraud and deceit are involved, general contractual disclaimers and exculpatory clauses, like the ones at issue here, have not automatically prevented a plaintiff from litigating his reasonable reliance on the misrepresentation in question."

What makes this case particularly troublesome for real estate professionals, as well as any person believing that s/he can rely on disclaiming contractual language, is the fact that the buyer was represented by an attorney in negotiating the P&S agreement. In this regard, the court noted, "There is no evidence ? that Section 25, or any other merger and exculpatory provisions of the P&S Agreement, a standard form with the exception of Rider A, was ever discussed, negotiated, or compromised."

The bottom line: The standard exculpatory language in purchase and sale agreements will not protect a seller or broker from fraudulent representations and may not stop an deceived buyer from obtaining judicial relief.

 

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Maintaining Homestead Protection

Pursuant to Massachusetts law, a homeowner may file a homestead declaration, which protects up to $500,000 of equity in his home. The protection also covers the declarant's spouse and children, if properly worded.

However, certain transfers made after filing a homestead can terminate the homestead protection. In the recent case of In re Hildebrandt, an unmarried couple purchased a home and one of the two filed a homestead declaration. Thereafter, the person who did not file the homestead transferred her interest in the property to the homestead declarant. The Massachusetts Bankruptcy Court ruled that the transfer deed terminated the pre-existing homestead.

Homesteads are often inadvertently terminated during estate planning changes. A filed homestead declaration may be terminated by:

? Selling or transferring of the property;

? Selling or transferring the declarant's interest in the property;

? Acquiring a new interest in the property, as was done in the Hildebrandt case;

? Deeding the property without reserving the homestead exemption;

? Releasing the homestead;

? Failing to have a long-term intention of residing at the property; or

? Filing a new homestead declaration.

It is important to know that filing a new homestead declaration will terminate the protection of a previously filed one. Given the protection provided by a homestead declaration, we urge you to consider filing one. However, if there are any intervening attachments, judgments or the like, you will not be protected by your new homestead.

Any time you are dealing with the title to your home, please call us so that we can advise you regarding the protection of the equity in your residence.

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I need to emphasize that every situation represents unique factors and circumstances which need to be evaluated. The general principles discussed above are "guideposts only." Several of these decisions may be reversed on appeal. If you have any questions about any of these or other issues, we would be happy to assist you in analyzing your particular situation.

Thank you.

Best regards,

ROBERT B. FEINGOLD & ASSOCIATES, P.C.

 

 

ROBERT B. FEINGOLD

RBF/prp

 

We send our newsletter to our clients and friends, free of charge, to share our impressions on new developments in the law. Although not intended as an advertisement, it may be deemed as such. Nothing in this newsletter should be relied upon as legal advice in any particular matter.

                     

Hello,

 

We would like to hear from you!  We have been publishing our newsletter for nine years now.  We try to bring to your attention legal developments that will be useful, as well as interesting.  If there are any areas that you would like us to add to our focus list, please let us know.  We will be glad to cover them.  If you have any suggestions about our format, the size of our font or anything at all, please let us know.  We would appreciate your feedback.

 

In this edition, we are covering several areas we don't usually cover - cellular tower strategies, elder law, protecting your commercial real estate from a tenant's bankruptcy proceedings, workplace religious discrimination and a new twist on real estate financing - "shared appreciation promissory notes."  As always, please feel free to call us with any questions that you may have.

 

 

ELDER LAW

 

 Nursing Home Expense

 

One of the most persistent and difficult problems we encounter in assisting our estate planning clients is planning around the possible expense of extended nursing home care.  As you probably know, the average nursing home in this area charges approximately $7,000 per month.  These bills add up quickly because nursing home stays are often lengthy.  The government does not pay for nursing home care unless you have exhausted almost all of your liquid assets.  Moreover, the government has the right to place a lien on your home to obtain reimbursement for the monies it pays to the nursing home for your care.  Most people do not want to transfer their assets out of their control in order to protect them, and the government will ignore a transfer without fair consideration if it occurs less than three years prior to the date of application for government financial assistance. 

 

Conflicts abound: People want to have control over their assets.  They want to give their assets to their children when they pass.  They also want to make sure that they receive the right health care when necessary and preferably at home.  And, as you would expect, the government would prefer not to pay for nursing home expenses for people who have assets. 

 

This is a very complicated area of the law.  There are ways of resolving the conflicts that are appropriate to each family, their assets and their life situations.  Most people are not aware of the techniques available to resolve these issues.  One of the most effective tools is long term care insurance.  It often eliminates the need to transfer assets and also the possible exhaustion of assets.  And in many instances, a corporation can deduct the premium paid as a benefit.   But it is not always available or affordable.    Other strategies and tools are available, but each must be very carefully designed to fit each family=s unique situation and values.

 

We are increasingly faced with the responsibility of assisting our clients in this area.  The sooner a family faces them, the easier it is for us to create effective solutions.  Please call if we can be of assistance.  Planning before a health crisis develops is essential.

 

 

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CELLULAR TOWERS

 

The Right Strategy

 

As cellular companies strive for better reception, you may receive a notice from your town=s zoning board that a cell company is seeking a permit to install a cellular tower near your home.  Most people would not like to have a tower near their property, because it decreases property values and especially because it spoils views. 

 

It is essential to provide the zoning board with reasons to deny the permit request.  Some of the factors to consider when opposing a permit for construction of a tower are:

 

1.            Whether there is in fact a service area gap around the proposed cell site;

2.            Whether the town has an area zoned for tower installation that would service

                the needs of the carrier;

3.            Whether there are existing towers that the carrier could use;

4.            Whether the tower would be more effective if placed at another location;

5.            The impact on property values; and

6.            The impact on views.


 

Prevailing at the zoning board hearing is almost essential, as the next step would be appealing to the courts.  AThe decision of the zoning board >cannot be disturbed unless it is based on a legally untenable ground, or is unreasonable, whimsical, capricious or arbitrary.=@ Also, the federal law in this area is complex and a full trial on appeal can be very expensive.  The goal needs to be a full court press for an early victory.

 

We are experienced in helping homeowners ensure that towers are constructed in their towns in a way that has minimal impact on residential, rural and historic areas.  We also have experience in negotiating tower leases.  Please let us know if we can assist you in this area.

 

 

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KEEPING A LEASE OUT OF A TENANT'S BANKRUPTCY

 

         A non-paying tenant is bad enough.  When he or it files for bankruptcy protection, disaster is often close behind.  To avoid possible entanglement with the bankruptcy process, a landlord should terminate the lease as soon as it appears the tenant is experiencing serious difficulties.  Prolonging the situation only increases the risk of even greater losses.

 

         The case of In Re: Tiny=s Café recently confirmed, AUnder Sections 362 and 541 of the Bankruptcy Code, a lease that has been terminated prior to the filing of bankruptcy is not property of the estate, and is thus not protected by the automatic stay.¿ 

 

The Tiny=s Café court discusses the ways in which a lease may be kept out of bankruptcy and what happens when the landlord fails to properly terminate a lease before a bankruptcy filing.  The essential elements required to keep a lease out of bankruptcy are:

 

       1.  The tenant is in breach of the lease;

       2.  The landlord terminates the lease before the

             tenant files for bankruptcy protection; and

3.    The landlord has not breached the lease in

      a way that justifies the tenant=s breach.

 

By acting quickly, landlords may avoid the expenses, delay and income loss of having their properties tied up in bankruptcy.  Failing to do so also subjects the landlord to losing control of tenant selection.  Rule of thumb:  cut your losses quickly and terminate immediately.  If the tenant wants to stay and has the means, negotiate a resolution after termination to better protect yourself.

 

 

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MAINTAINING HOMESTEAD PROTECTION

 

Refinancing, Etc.

 

Pursuant to Massachusetts law, a homeowner may file a homestead declaration, which protects up to $500,000 of equity in his or her home.  The protection also covers the declarant=s spouse and children, if properly worded.

 

However, certain transfers made after filing a homestead can terminate the homestead protection.  In the recent case of  In re Hildebrandt, an unmarried couple purchased a home and one of the two filed a homestead declaration.  Thereafter, the spouse who did not file the homestead transferred her interest in the property to her husband who had filed it.  The Massachusetts Bankruptcy Court ruled that the deed terminated the earlier homestead.  The family lost its protection and house.

 

Another way in which homestead protection may be lost is during estate planning changes.  Property held in trust is not eligible for homestead protection.  Also, the transfer of  jointly owned property to just one of the spouses without specific mention of the previously filed homestead will terminate an earlier homestead.

 

In sum, a filed homestead declaration may be terminated by:

 

$      Transferring of the property;

$      Selling or transferring the declarant=s interest in the property;

$      Acquiring a new interest in the property, as was done in the Hildebrandt 

         case;

$      Deeding the property without reserving the homestead exemption;

$      Releasing the homestead; or

$      Filing a new homestead declaration. (Intervening liabilities could become  

        a problem.)

 

You are no longer required to release your rights under a recorded homestead when refinancing.  A statement in the mortgage itself waiving your rights in the homestead with respect to that mortgage does not cancel your homestead.  The homestead remains enforceable against any other creditors.

 

Given the protection provided by a homestead declaration, we urge you to consider filing one, and check with us when you are dealing with your title to make sure that you are not inadvertently terminating your homestead.  In this regard, we can assist you in ensuring that you have the fullest homestead protection.

 

 

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GETTING ATTORNEYS' FEES

FROM YOUR INSURANCE CARRIER

 

If you or your business suffers what you believe to be an insured loss but your carrier denies coverage, the decision to pursue a claim against your carrier can be difficult.  One of the key factors is the value of the loss in relation to the attorneys= fee you will incur.  However, this factor may be less important, because a Massachusetts Superior Court has determined that insureds who pursue such claims and prevail may be entitled to their attorneys= fees.  The critical factor in the decision is now the likelihood of success.

 

In Wilkinson v. Citation Ins. Co., a fire in the plaintiffs= residence caused a personal property loss of nearly $50,000.  Their insurance carrier denied the claim.  The court granted judgment for the plaintiffs in June 2004.  Based on their judgment, the plaintiff requested that they be awarded the attorneys= fees they incurred.  In the first judgment of its kind in Massachusetts, the court agreed with the plaintiffs and awarded them their attorneys= fees.  We need to wait to see if this new rule is made applicable statewide.

 

 

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THE EXPANDING SCOPE OF

NON-COMPETITION AGREEMENTS

 

The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) has recently clarified the law regarding non-competition agreements.  In Boulanger v. Dunkin= Donuts, Inc., the SJC ruled that restricting an former franchisee=s ability to work with a five-mile limit of any Dunkin= Donuts store for two years was Areasonable, not only because a number of our cases have held larger geographic areas to be reasonable, but also because Y the covenant not to compete was protecting the defendant=s franchise system.@ 

 

Although the Boulanger case involved a franchise relationship, it has important consequences for all non-competition agreements, especially regarding geographic limitations.  In effect, the holding prohibited the former employee from competing virtually anywhere in New England because of the omnipresence of Dunkin= Donuts stores in our region. 

 

The SJC also noted that the plaintiff Awas represented by counsel@ when he signed the non-competition agreement.  This is one reason we recommend that, at least with respect to key employees, employers strongly recommend that employees with whom they are negotiating seek the advice of counsel.  By doing so, the employer will almost certainly defeat any subsequent claim that the employee did not understand the restriction.   If there is a dispute, the employee will likely hire any attorney who will defeat an overreaching agreement in any event.


 

In another restrictive covenant case, the Massachusetts Superior Court in WordWave, Inc. v. Owens refused to enforce a non-competition.  However, the court did enforce the non-solicitation component of the agreement. 

 

What makes this case interesting is the fact the non-competition and non-solicitation covenants had the same geographical scope (i.e., all of New England).  Yet, the court, in refusing to issue a preliminary injunction regarding the non-competition agreement, stated that it was doing so because the covenant=s Aoverly-broad substantive and geographic scopes are likely to render [it] unenforceable.@  However, in enforcing the non-solicitation covenant, the court stated, Acourts may nonetheless enforce overly-broad covenants to the extent reasonable and feasible. ... In such cases, courts have >saved= covenants by decreasing their scope.@  The court went on to limit the geographic scope of and enforce the non-solicitation covenant.

 

Confidential information is a vital aspect of business and employer=s should take all reasonable steps to protect it.  They are many twists and turns when drafting and enforcing non-competition and non-solicitation agreements.  However, one consistent thread in the case law is that courts do not favor restrictive covenants.  Another common thread, important to employers, is that the Massachusetts courts are increasingly amenable to non-competition agreements in large geographic areas, so long as the employer does business in that area.  

 

We are available to discuss with you effective ways to preserve your confidential information and your customer relationships, including the use of non-competition agreements.  We can assist you in drafting reasonable restrictive covenants so that, when you need to enforce one, the covenant will be more likely to be enforced.

 

 

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PERSONAL LIABILITY FOR YOUR COMPANY'S TAXES

 

A corporate financial officer may be personally liable for his company=s failure to pay federal withholding taxes, even if the corporation=s president instructs him not to pay the taxes.  In Lubetzky v. United States, the First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a jury verdict finding that a corporation=s CFO was personally liable for back taxes and interest of over $90,000.  The court relied on the Internal Revenue Code section establishing Aa penalty for such a failure [to pay taxes] equal to the unpaid tax can be collected from >any person= who was >required= but >willfully= failed to pay over the withheld taxes.@  The court found that the CFO was a Aresponsible person@, because he (i) was the sole signator on Apayroll checks as well as checks to suppliers, subcontractors and others@ and (ii) prepared and signed the corporation=s federal employment tax returns.


 

The compelling aspect of this case was the undisputed fact that the CFO repeatedly told the corporation=s president and its parent=s president that the taxes needed to be paid.  He was told that the taxes Awould be paid when money was available, but that suppliers had to be paid now so the company could remain in business.@ 

 

In this situation, the CFO had to choose between offering his resignation and personal liability for the company=s employment taxes.

 

 

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OBTAINING A VALID RELEASE

OF WAGE ACTS CLAIMS

 

In Gordon v. Millivision Holdings, LLC,  the Superior Court ruled that an employee could not sue his employer and its president for unpaid wages where the employee had signed a release of his rights under the state=s Wage Act. 

 

In Gordon, the employer was a start-up company.  Due to financial difficulties, employees, including the plaintiff, worked without receiving full pay.  After receiving financial backing, the employer offered plaintiff and other employees stock options to compensate them for the wages that were owed.  The offer of stock options was contingent on the employees agreeing to Arelease any claims for compensation that it had against Millivision, Inc. and its members, officers, employees or agents.@  The plaintiff agreed to this condition by signing an employment agreement.  The plaintiff=s employment ended less than one year later.

 

The court rejected the plaintiff=s reliance on an earlier case, Dobin, which held that a wage deferral agreement was void as contrary to the specific language of the Wage Act.  AThis court agrees ... that such a waiver is unlawful; however, a waiver is very different from a release.  The law prohibits a waiver of the employee=s rights under the Wage Act; it does not prohibit releasing those rights after the claim has been established.@

 

A valid release requires that the employee release his wage claim after it matures (i) for good consideration and (ii) without duress.  While the court did not provide specifics as to what would constitute good consideration, it implied that alternative arrangements, such as offering stock options and taking a note, would be acceptable. 

 

 

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WORKPLACE RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION

 

Facial Jewelry

             Given expanding Areligious@ practices affecting the workplace, employers are struggling to address what Areasonable accommodations@ can or should be made for employees.  In Cloutier v. Costco Wholesale Corp., the employee alleged that her employer failed to offer her a reasonable accommodation where the employer=s Ano facial jewelry@ policy conflicted with the employee=s religious practice as a member of the Church of Body Modification.  The First Circuit Court affirmed the District Court=s grant of summary judgment on the ground that the employee=s desired accommodation B a complete waiver of the Ano facial jewelry@ policy B represented an undue hardship on the employer.  The Court found that a complete exemption from the Ano-facial-jewelry@ policy would impose an Aundue hardship@ on the employer=s efforts to present a professional public image.

This case is remarkable in many obvious respects.  Suffice it for us to say that for practical reasons these matters must be taken seriously by an employer confronted by this kind of situation.  The legal expense of taking a case through trial and the federal appeal process is considerable.

 

 

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INSTITUTING AN ARBITRATION POLICY

FOR EMPLOYEES?

ADEQUATE NOTICE OF THE

CHANGE MUST BE GIVEN

 

The federal District Court in Massachusetts recently ruled that sending a general, mass e-mail notice to inform employees of a new, mandatory arbitration policy was insufficient notice for the arbitration policy to be enforceable.  In Campbell v. General Dynamics, an employee sued for disability discrimination.  The employer moved to stay the court proceedings and to compel arbitration, because it had implemented an arbitration policy.  The court addressed the issue of whether Aunder general principles of state contract law and under the language of the [federal disability discrimination statute],@ the employer gave sufficient notice to bind the plaintiff to the arbitration agreement.

 

The court found that employer did not provide the minimal level of notice, because: 

 

a.   The employer Adid nothing but send the email@ to inform employees of the new arbitration policy;

b.   Employees were not required to send a return e-mail indicating that they had read the email or the attachments, or understood and accepted the contents;

c.   Employees were not asked to sign any paper document stating that they had read and understood the new arbitration policy;

d.   The employer did not send any paper announcements of the new policy; and 

e.   The employer did not hold a meeting announcing the policy, where it could have had a sign-in sheet to verify who attended. 

 

The court held that a minimal level of notice would have included addressing some, but not necessarily all, of the foregoing.  These considerations will probably apply to other employment policy modifications.

 

 

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THE USURY LAW AND SHARED

APPRECIATION PROMISSORY NOTES

 

The criminal usury statute, G.L. c. 271, ' 49, prohibits the charging of interest greater than 20% per annum, unless the lender first informs the Attorney General of his intent to charge a higher rate.  Even so, ' 49 may not apply to a loan having a 2,000% rate of return.  Dealing with Aa question of first impression in Massachusetts,@ the Superior Court in Comstock v. Steinbergh addressed the issue of A[w]hether a loan can be rendered usurious by an agreement that the lender shall receive a share in the net proceeds received from the sale of a premises, Y.@

 

In Comstock, the plaintiff bought a condominium from the defendants.  Pursuant to the sale, the plaintiff (i) assumed two mortgages by executing a promissory note to the defendants, (ii) made a 20% down payment, and (iii) borrowed the remaining amount needed for the purchase from the defendants pursuant to a Shared Appreciation Promissory Note, which was secured by a wrap-around mortgage.  The Promissory Note had an annual interest rate of 10% for a three-year term and provided that:

 

Upon the sale of the premises Y the Maker shall pay to the Holder, in addition to the principal and interest set forth above, 48 percent of the net proceeds received from the resale of said premises.

 

The plaintiff filed an action requesting that the Promissory Note be declared usurious because he realized that, if he sold the condo, which had drastically appreciated in value, the defendants would receive over $100,000.  However, the court stated:


 

Aside from his claim that the terms of the defendants= loan were usurious, the plaintiff does not offer any legal or equitable reasons to invalidate the Promissory Note and Wrap-around Mortgage, which were the product of a good faith, arm=<